

# Economic Intelligene: Weekly Review

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SECRET 25X1 **ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW** 31 August 1978 Poland: Payments Problems Persist Despite Shrinking Trade Deficit ...... 12 Despite success in trimming the trade deficit with the West, Warsaw for the third consecutive year has to dlg up \$4 billion to cover its financial gap. Kenya: Economic Stake of Kenyatta Family..... 14 The late President's Inner circle occupies many of the key economic posts and owns extensive agricultural and commercial properties. 20 USSR: Borrowing Beyond Needs for Orenburg Pipeline ..... Soviet credit arrangements for the pipeline have exceeded needs by more than \$1 billion, with Moscow apparently able to use the extra funds for general balance-of-payments purposes. Cuba: Hustling Consumer Goods ..... 26 A loosely organized black market flourishes because of the chronic shortage of consumer goods and the excess pesos in the hands of the populace. Notes ..... 25X6 Iraq and India Consider Joining Intersputnik 25X1 ............. ER EIWR 78-035 31 August 1978 SECRET

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# POLAND: PAYMENTS PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE SHRINKING TRADE DEFICIT

Poland's payments problems are worsening despite its success in cutting its trade deficit with the West. For the third consecutive year, Warsaw has had to borrow some \$4 billion to cover its financial gap. Although most of the financing needed this year already has been arranged, Poland's efforts to raise the remainder have been stalled, at least temporarily. Even if Poland scrapes through this year, an even more serious financial crunch in 1979 could well force either a major debt rescheduling or a painful cutback in imports.

Poland: Financial Gap with Non-Communist Countries

	1976	1977	1978 1
444		Million US \$	
Current account deficits:	3,375	2,645	1,950
Of which, interest expenditures	640	800	1,030
Debt amortization	1,000	1,550	2,200
Financial gap Drawings on medium- and long-	-4,375	-4,195	-4,150
term credits debt and	3,200	3,695	
changes in reserves, net *	1,175	500	
External debt yearend	10,200	12,800	14,750
Exports, f.o.b.	4,442	4,882	5,400
Imports, f.o.b. 4	7,375	7,057	6,700
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Percent	
Debt service ratio 5	37	48	60

<sup>1</sup> Projected.

#### Trade Deficit Continues to Fall...

Warsaw has had to reduce imports from the West to cope with its rising balance-of-payments problems. Following a 4.3-percent decline in 1977, imports from the West fell another 10 percent during the first half of this year, though for the year as a whole a reduction of 5 percent seems more likely. Cutbacks in imports of machinery and equipment and industrial materials have been particularly severe, slowing production in some sectors. Regime spokesmen have voiced particular concern over lagging production for export markets.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Adjusted for net credits extended by Poland to non-Communist countries.

May include some medium-term credits.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Trade with all non Communist countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Repayments of principal on medium- and long-term debt and interest on all debts as a percentage of exports to all non-Communist countries.

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Polish exports to the West increased at an annual rate of about 10 percent in the first half of the year. The Poles should—with some effort—be able to sustain this rate throughout 1978, thereby matching last year's export rise. Thus, Poland's trade deficit with the West is expected to fall to \$1.3 billion, down considerably from the record level of \$2.9 billion in 1976 and the \$2.2 billion of 1977.

# ... But Payment Obligations Rise

Despite the improvement in Poland's trade balance, debt service payments continue to soar. At \$3.2 billion in 1978, they are double the amount of 1976 and will be equivalent to 60 percent of Polish exports to the West, compared with 37 percent in 1976. This rapid rise is causing concern among Poland's Western creditors—especially in the private sector—and has led to a general reevaluation of their lending policies toward Poland over the last six to nine months.

# Rounding Up Credits

Financing requirements for 1978 are estimated at \$4 billion, more than one-half of which has already been arranged. We believe that Poland can count on \$3.0 billion to \$3.5 billion in medium- and long-term credits tied to specific goods, most of which will likely have some form of Western government backing. The Poles themselves claim to have \$3.5 billion in such credits that they can use this year:

- \$1.7 billion in government-backed medium- and long-term credits to finance imports of machinery and equipment.
- \$800 million in government-backed medium-term credits—including \$500 million in US CCC credits—to help finance agricultural imports, mainly grain.
- \$1.0 billion in medium-term credits—including government-backed credits—to finance imports of industrial goods, which generally have been purchased on a cash or short-term credit basis.

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#### Outlook

Assuming that the Poles are able to raise the \$3.5 billion in medium- and longterm credits linked to specific goods, we estimate their minimum additional borrowing requirements for untied credits in 1978 at about \$500 million. Borrowing beyond this amount could be used to replenish Poland's foreign exchange reserves, which apparently were drawn down by more than \$200 million last year. Such a build-up would help alleviate Poland's tight cash flow situation and perhaps even allow a reduction in some relatively more expensive short-term borrowing. Borrowing above the minimum required would also provide Poland with a welcome cushion in the event that (a) some of the financing tied to imports fails to materialize or (b) the Poles fail to push exports by the projected rate or to keep imports down. In any event, Poland's efforts to raise upwards of \$1 billion in financial syndications apparently will drag on beyond the original summer timetable; late autumn appears to be the new target date. If by that time Poland fails to secure such credits or if some of the credits tied to imports are not obtained, Poland will have to (a) increase its short-term borrowing, with obvious implications for next year, (b) draw down even more its dwindling foreign exchange reserves, or (c) cut imports further.

Any increase in Poland's short-term debt will add to next year's financial gap, which we now estimate at about \$4.5 billion. Poland's debt service ratio in turn would climb from 60 percent this year to 65 percent or more in 1979. Warsaw will undoubtedly intensify its efforts to secure medium- or long-term credits tied to future deliveries of copper or other commodities, while continuing to seek balance-of-payments credits in the West. It will also continue to attempt to delay payments on its outstanding debt, as in its request for ballooning payments on CCC credits. If all these measures fail to provide the needed relief, Warsaw will have to ask for debt rescheduling—which it has tried so hard to avoid on a multilateral basis—or accept the consequences of additional import cuts.

#### \* \* \* \* \*

# KENYA: ECONOMIC STAKE OF KENYATTA FAMILY

The family and closest associates of the late President Jomo Kenyatta have occupied many of the key posts in the Kenyan economy and have accumulated extensive agricultural and commercial wealth during the 15-year Kenyatta rule. This Kenyatta clique of Kikuyu tribal leaders currently forms the only group in likely

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position to mount a stiff challenge to acting president Daniel T. arap Moi—a member of the minority Kalenjin tribal group—and his major supporter Attorney General Charles Njonjo. The clique's efforts to outmaneuver Acting President Moi have so far failed; their substantial investments in the Kenyan economy probably will deter them from making a blatantly unconstitutional move. For the longer run, the desire of the Moi-Njonjo group to increase its share of the economic pie and the growing public disenchantment with the Kenyatta clan's economic monopoly could foment political unrest. Mounting economic problems will reinforce pressures for a redivision of the country's wealth.

# The Royal Family Jewels

Kenyatta's extended family boasts extensive holdings of farms, plantations, hotels, casinos, and insurance, shipping, and real estate companies. Besides occupying major public office, several members of the family fill influential posts in large industrial companies doing business in Kenya, including Lonrho (a British multinational active in African agriculture) and the Ford Motor Company.

Family members and close associates control a large part of the land in the White Highlands, the homeland of Kenyatta's tribe, the Kikuyu. At independence in 1963, the British established a fund to help the Kenyan Government purchase farms from European settlers in this area and redistribute them among land-hungry African farmers. Although hundreds of African farmers were resettled through this scheme, some of the funds allegedly were used by family members and by Kenyatta's ministers to accumulate land. To protect the holdings of its members and the family, the government blocked every parliamentary attempt to limit land ownership.

Kenyatta himself owned only about a half-dozen properties covering roughly 4,000 hectares, mainly farms in the Rift Valley and in the district of Kiambu, where he was born. His fourth wife, Mama Ngina Kenyatta, however, owns at least 115,000 hectares including a 13,000-hectare ranch in the Kiambu district, two tea plantations at Matu and Mangu, and three sisal farms near the Tanzanian border. She also has considerable holdings in the resort areas around Mombasa and is involved in coffee plantations and in the Kenyan ruby mines.

Other members of the late President's family have also prospered under his rule. His son by his first wife, Peter Muigai Kenyatta, holds a seat in Parliament and is part owner of Inchcape, a trading company that handles among other things the Ford Motor eoncession in Kenya. Peter Kenyatta and his sister Margaret, the former mayor of Nairobi, also own large tracts of land. The late President's cousins include the director of Lonrho in Kenya, the chairman of the company that built the Mombasa-to-Nairobi gas pipeline, and Kenya's sole film distributor.

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Besides their other activities, Mama Ngina and Margaret Kenyatta are probably the country's two largest charceal and ivory traders—particularly lucrative businesses. Although the export of these items is banned because depletion of Kenya's forests and wildlife threaten the underpinnings of the Kenyan economy, both women have been able to obtain special licenses and are rumored to be involved in smuggling. For instance, shortly after a ban on ivory exports (except for tusks from elephants dead of natural causes or shot for control purposes) went into effect, the United Africa Corporation, whose chairman and chief stockholder is Margaret Kenyatta, received an export license for 1,250 baby elephant tusks.

# Family Assets Threatened?


Should Moi, with the aid of Njonjo and other supporters, consolidate his position during the transition period and gain the presidency in his own right\*—an event that seems likely at the moment—the division of economic power could begin to shift. Family ties to the transition government are tenuous. Although Njonjo and Finance Minister Mwai Kibaki are Kikuyus, both for the time being are principal figures in the Moi camp. Moi and Njonjo—both rumored to be involved in land and other business dealings—could capitalize on the widespread dislike of Mama Ngina and on public discontent over corruption to take over large shares of the family's holdings. Whether attempted as a first step toward widespread income redistribution or merely as a shift of resources in favor of the new rulers, such a move would almost certainly provoke a strong political response from the Kenyatta family.

# Growing Popular Disgruntlement

The Kenyatta family's hold on the economy is increasingly resented. Public criticism has been fanned by open parliamentary debate about scandals and high level corruption which has been widely publicized by the country's free press. Students and faculty at the University of Nairobi are particularly concerned about the uneven distribution of Kenya's wealth and income. They and, increasingly, the man on the street are very critical of the family's involvement in the charcoal and ivory trade, which endangers vital national resources:

• The destruction of Kenyan forests and scrubland for charcoal has reduced the habitat for wildlife and encouraged the encroaching desert, threatening tourism and the livelihood of most Kenyans who are subsistence farmers. In the last decade the country has lost 10 percent of its largest forest area, and one-fourth of the land now is classed as arid. As a result, soil erosion has

<sup>\*</sup> The constitution calls for a presidential election within 90 days of the president's death. In the absence of an opposition party, the candidate of KANU (Kenya Africa National Union) will probably be proclaimed president.



increased; at the mouth of the Galana River, silt has risen threefold in a single year.

• Ivory smuggling is taking a heavy toll on Kenyan elephant herds, the main tourist attraction. Figures for 1973, the last time a comprehensive survey was made, indicate that poaching resulted in the slaughter of 10,000 to 25,000 elephants in that year. Recent reports indicate that in Tsavo National Park—Kenya's largest park—the elephant herd has been reduced to only 2,000. Moreover, allowable Kenyan exports of high quality heavy ivory from mature bull elephants is down, leading to speculation that animals over the ages of 30-35 are almost extinct.

With the economy headed for balance-of-payments problems in the next several years after more than a decade of 5-percent growth, austerity measures may be in store, and popular discontent could grow. Kenya's payments accounts are under pressure from several sources; Nairobi has already considered applying to the IMF for assistance:

- Falling prices for coffee and tea—the country's major exports—are adding to the current account deficit. In addition, heavy rains damaged this year's coffee crop.
- Security worries due to Somali irridentism has put Kenya in the market for increased arms purchases. A US survey team has recommended a 10-year package to expand and modernize the Kenyan military at a cost of \$560 million to \$1,190 million. The first phase of the modernization is scheduled to be completed by July 1979 and will cost Kenya \$49 million. Almost all of the program would have to be funded by Nairobi.
- Collapse of the East African Community last year adversely affected the balance of payments. Kenya lost its major African trading partner, Tanzania, which accounted for 10 percent of Kenyan exports, and tourism has suffered from the closure of the Tanzanian border.

The new government may find itself forced to cut back on consumer imports and on development programs to pay for increased military purchases and keep the payments deficit manageable. A cut in consumer imports would add to shortages that presently exist, especially for sugar and meat, besides aggravating inflation. If the development effort slowed, unemployment—especially in the cities—would likely rise, fanning the discontent of urban dwellers already cynical about the concentration of wealth in a few hands. Urban unemployment currently is severe, especially among university and secondary school graduates, half of whom cannot find work appropriate to their educational levels.

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#### USSR: BORROWING BEYOND NEEDS FOR ORENBURG PIPELINE

Credit arrangements, ostensibly for the Orenburg gas pipeline, have exceeded requirements, netting the USSR more than \$1 billion in untied long-term credits in 1976-78 and reducing Soviet reliance on commercial borrowing for other purposes. The Soviets have received \$2.5 billion from CEMA's International Investment Bank (IIB) to finance purchases of pipe and equipment. Although the \$2.5 billion is sufficient to pay for all Orenburg-related imports, the Soviets have also lined up more than \$1 billion in Western supplier credits to finance the same purchases. Moscow apparently has been able to use these extra funds for general balance-of-payments purposes.

## Financing Orenburg

Five East European countries.—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland—agreed in 1974 to supply labor, construction materials, and the requisite hard currency for the Orenburg gas pipeline. Romania agreed only to provide financing for a gas treatment plant at Orenburg. In return for their investment the East European countries are to receive 15.5 billion cubic meters of gas annually between 1980 and 1990—2.8 billion for each of the five countries working on the pipeline and 1.5 billion for Romania. Deliveries from Orenburg may begin later this year; whether they will reach the target level by 1980 is still uncertain.

The IIB is the conduit for funds for the project. Through 1977, the IIB extended \$2.5 billion in hard currency to East European countries for the pipeline. The IIB's borrowing for Orenburg roughly equals its credit extensions; the bank has borrowed \$2.0 billion in four consortium loans since October 1975. Another \$500 million loan is now under syndication. The IIB has been able to borrow on the Eurodollar market at terms better than the individual East European countries could have obtained on their own; the \$500 million loan is for 10 years including a grace period of 5-½ years with an interest rate of  $\frac{5}{2}$  percent over the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) for the first  $\frac{2-\frac{1}{2}}{2}$  years and a  $\frac{3}{4}$ -percent spread thereafter.

# Mechanics of Financing

In acquiring hard currency for the project the IIB borrows funds in the Eurodollar market and then relends the money to the East European investors in the Orenburg project. They in turn pass the money to the USSR, which negotiates the contracts and pays for the imports from the West.

The USSR has already purchased most of the Western equipment for the project. West Germany, Japan, and possibly Italy have supplied about 1.7 million tons of large

diameter pipe worth about \$1 billion. The Soviets have also bought \$775 million of equipment for 22 compressor stations from West Cerman and Italian firms. A \$195 million order for the gas desulfurization plant went to France. Several smaller orders have boosted the hard currency cost of the pipeline to more than \$2 billion.

# Where Has All the Money Gone?

Although the sum borrowed by the IIB roughly equals the cost of imports from the West, total borrowing for the project substantially exceeds the project's foreign exchange costs. In addition to the IIB funds, the USSR has obtained supplier credits from the West for most of the imports for the pipeline. French Government credits financed the sale of the desulfurization plant—apparently the one that Romania was obligated to finance. The \$150 million order for five compressor stations from Italy was financed by an Italian credit. Finally, almost all Soviet orders for large-diameter pipe in the past several years have been financed under credits from West Germany, Japan, and Italy.

The Soviet double dipping probably will provide at least \$3.5 billion in Western credits to finance somewhat more than \$2 billion in hard currency imports. Even allowing for higher cash imports than we can identify, the financial arrangements for the Orenburg project apparently have made well over \$1 billion in untied credits available to the USSR in 1976-78.

#### **Debt Repayment**

The USSR will repay the East European hard currency investment with natural gas; the East European countries will have to repay the IIB with hard currency so that IIB can, in turn, repay the \$2.5 billion in Eurodollar loans. Several of the East European countries, already struggling with large hard currency debts, will be hard pressed to meet this additional obligation. However, the natural gas they will receive will reduce their need to spend hard currency for high-priced Western energy.

Soviet officials have stated that the price of the gas will be determined according to the CEMA foreign trade price system, in which prices are calculated as the average of world prices for the previous five years. The Soviet gas price to CEMA countries was about \$42 per thousand cubic meters in 1976 and is estimated to have increased to \$50 per thousand cubic meters in 1977. According to the CEMA pricing formula, Soviet gas prices will continue to rise and may be about \$60 by 1980. The 15.5 billion cubic meters of gas scheduled for annual delivery during 1980-90 would be valued at \$930 million. Taking into account the 1978-79 shipments, the East European investment would be repaid by 1983. Gas deliveries to Eastern Europe would continue until 1990 under the agreement, but the terms of payment are unknown.

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# Natural gas exports to Western Europe through the Orenburg line will yield the USSR \$750 million to \$1 billion annually in hard currency assuming prices of \$60 and \$80 per thousand cubic meters, respectively. The capacity of the pipeline is sufficient to allow for Soviet exports of up to 12.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually after export commitments to Eastern Europe have been met.

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CUBA: HUSTLING CONSUMER GOODS
A loosely organized black market specializing in nondurable consumer goods continues to flourish throughout Cuba, particularly in the Havana metropolitan area. The market's vitality in the face of longstanding government attempts at suppression reflects the continued shortage of most consumer items and the large amount of excess purchasing power in the hands of the Cuban people. Although the black market accounts for only a small share of Cuban economic activity, it constitutes a major outlet for the populace's frustration with its austere lifestyle and is therefore a stabilizing influence in Cuban society.
Market Organization
Cuban black market is a decentralized, loosely knit operation. Most of the consumer goods in this market originate in capitalist countries and are smuggled into Cuba by
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Items on the black market consist mainly of small consumer items that can easily be transported clandestinely and command a high enough price to make the risk worthwhile, such as watches, sunglasses, scarves and other wearing apparel, jewelry, and small radios. Trading in foodstuffs is largely confined to farm areas because of the lower value and the difficulty of transporting food items. A major exception is coffee, which is strictly rationed in "coffee-loving" Cuba. Little, if any, trading takes place in large durable items, such as refrigerators and television sets, because householders must show proof of ownership and origin.

#### **Currency and Other Transactions**

A considerable amount of currency also is traded on the black market. Given the endemic surplus of purchasing power, Cuban black marketers can readily acquire large amounts of domestic pesos. These are discounted to the diplomatic community—particularly the Soviets—and sometimes to tourists at about four pesos to the US dollar, about five times the official exchange rate. The foreign diplomats and tourists thus multiply the purchasing power of their personal budgets while the black marketers obtain scarce hard currency to pass on to their contacts in the Cuban and Western merchant marine to procure Western consumer goods for resale on the black market.

Other sub rosa activities of Cuban citizens to	to augment their meager official
earnings and brighten their austere lifestyle includ	e a bustling "cottage industry"—
manufacture of goods in private homes—and the	e "bolita" (lottery). The cottage
industry specializes in small handicraft items such a	s jewelry and is frequently staffed
by dropouts from the labor force.	one such operation raided
by the police produced a hoard of pesos worth \$15	50,000 and employed five persons
making \$26 per day—well over twice the average	wage in Cuba.
	<u> </u>

The bolita, widely known in pre-Castro days, has apparently retained its popularity. The government has apparently made only a token attempt to eradicate the bolita, recognizing not only its overwhelming popularity but also the extreme difficulty of penetrating the small cell system by which the lottery is operated.

#### **Profit Potential**

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The potential for extremely large and immediate profits overcomes the fear of government crackdowns and penalties. To judge from the wide price discrepancies, the returns can be enormous for those willing to pit their imagination and ingenuity against the system. For example, smuggled watches and scarves, which cost about \$150

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Cuba: Official and Black Market Prices for Frequently Traded Items

		US\$
Ete aa	Official Price	Black Market Price
Beans (per lb.)	0.21	2.00
Beef (per lb.)	0.43	5.00
Rice (per lb.)	0.20	0.80-1.00
Coffee (per lb.)	0.96	16.00-20.00
Auto batteries	10.00-12.00	80.00-100.00
Gasoline (per gal.)	0.60	1.20
Shirt	5.50-6.00	25.00-30.00
Pants	15.00-30.00	40.00-75.00
Scarf	12.00	25.00-35.00
Shoes	12.00-16.00	80.00-120.00

and \$17 respectively at dockside in Havana, can be sold in eastern Cuba for \$450 and \$34, respectively; the black marketer can in turn purchase coffee, which is grown almost exclusively in the eastern area, for about \$5.50 per pound with subsequent resale in Havana at up to \$20 per pound—an overall profit of about 1,000 percent for the 1,930-kilometer round trip.

## **Fundamental Forces**

The vitality of the black market and other forms of illegal activity stems from the continued shortages of most consumer items, the large amounts of excess purchasing power in the hands of the Cuban populace, and the inability of the government to totally suppress illegal transactions. Cuba's "socialist command economy" falls far short of meeting consumer demand because of the particular priorities and inefficiencies characteristic of the Soviet-type economy and because of continued low world sugar prices. Almost all wearing apparel and foodstuffs, including sugar, continue to bc strictly rationed. The major exceptions are a few luxury items, such as rum and cigarettes. Moreover, within the last two years the ration allotment of selected items has been trimmed. At the same time aggregate personal income (measured in pesos) has jumped 38 percent since 1973, reflecting higher salary scales and the accelerated growth of the Cuban labor force, particularly in the service sector. Pesos accordingly have piled up in the hands of the rank-and-file Cuban. As for the attitude of the leadership, we have no evidence of appreciable corruption among top-level government officials although there are indications of isolated cases of midlevel involvement and police protection at low levels.

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
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
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Iraq and India Consider Joining Intersputnik  An Iraqi Government delegation reportedly left for Moscow in late June to discuss participation in Intersputnik, the Soviet-controlled international satellite communications organization. The USSR has also suggested that India join Intersputnik. We do not know the Iraqi and Indian responses to these proposals. Any success in attracting new members for Intersputnik would enhance Soviet technical prestige and Soviet control over Bloc satellite communications and could generate greater voting support for the Soviet position in international forums such as the upcoming World Administrative Radio Conference.	25X1

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# **Economic Indicators Weekly Review**

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
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
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#### **FOREWORD**


- 1. The Economic Indicators Weekly Review provides up-to-date information on changes in the domestic and external economic activities of the major non-Communist developed countries. To the extent possible, the Economic Indicators Weekly Review is updated from press ticker and Embassy reporting, so that the results are made available to the reader weeks—or sometimes months—before receipt of official statistical publications. US data are provided by US government agencies.
- Source notes for the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are revised every few months. The most recent date of publication of source notes is 16 February 1978.
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# Approved For Release 2004/07/28: CIA-RDP80T00702A000800030004-6 BIG SIX FOREIGN COUNTRIES COMPOSITE INDICATORS






# **Consumer Price Inflation** Percent, seasonally adjusted, annual rate 20 15 Big Six United States Note: Three-month average compered with pravious three months.





Redering Company of the State o	LATEST	Percent Change		RAGE ANN						LATEST MO	NTH	1 Yea	r Earlie		Months Earlier
	MONTH	Month	1970	Earlier	Earlier <sup>2</sup>		Unemployment Big Five	. Rei	e	MAY 78	4.4		4.2		4.3
industrial Production							United States	•		MAY 78	6 1		7 1		6 1
Big Six	MAY 78	-0.7	2.8	2.6	3.9	Ŧ		·	- 200	-p 78 11 c	jar m	<del>.</del>			j. 1 6%
United States	MAY 78	0.5	3.7	5.0	10.2	i	1 11		ATEST ONTH	MILLION US \$	(	UMULA? 1978	TIVE (M 1977		N US \$) Change
Consumer Prices						,	Trade Balance								
Big Six	JUN 78	0.6	9.2	6.2	7.2	- 1		7	IN 70	0.504			13.68	· ·	14,767
United States	JUN 78	0.9	6.7	7.4	10.7	i	SIX	* 1	JN 78	6,521	- 2	8,447	13,00	U	14,707
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
 $\label{eq:Approved For Release 2004/07/28: CIA-RDP80T00702A000800030004-6} \ ^{2}\text{Avarage for letast 3 months compared with average for pravious 3 months, seasonelly adjusted at annual rete.}$ 


# INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX: 1970=100, seasonally adjusted


















		Percent Change from		ERAGE ANN VTH RATE :				Percent Change from		ERAGE ANN	
	LATEST MONTH	Previous Month	1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months . Earlier 1		LATEST MONTH	Previous Month	1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier 1
United States	JUL 78	0.5	3.8	4.8	10.3	United Kingdom	JUN 78	1.4	0.6	4.3	3.6
Japan	JUN 78	-0.6	3.9	4.7	6.5	. Jtaly.	JUN 78	-1.0	3.1	44.	2.6 .
West Germany	JUN 78	0.9	1.9	0.0	-3.4	. Car <u>ra</u> da _	MAY 78	-0.8	2.7	2.4	1.0
France	MAY 78	-3.1	3.1	3.3	13.4	_ <b>£</b> )					


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



**PERCENT** 













# CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION

Percent, seasonally adjusted, annual rate<sup>1</sup>






# Japan



# **West Germany**



## France





1975


1974

1976

1977







e wije		Percent Change		ERAGE ANN					Percent Change		ERAGE ANN WTH RATE S		
	LATEST MONTH	from Previous Month	1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier <sup>2</sup>			LATEST MONTH	from Previous Month	1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier <sup>2</sup>	
United States	JUN 78	0.9	6.7	7.4	10.7	United King	qom	JIJL 78	1,1	13.1	1.8.	6.2	÷
Japan	JUN 78	0,3	9,8	3.5	6.1	į Italy	=	JIJN 78	1.2	13.1	12.2-	12.4	,
West Germany	JUN 78	0.1	5.2	2.4	2.2	(Capada		JIIL 78	1.2	7.8	9.8.	11.3	
France	JUN 78	0.9	9.0	9.0	11.4	i ii	i						
encore executive						,				÷			

! #

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er 17.878

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months, seasonally adjusted at annual rate.

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**Constant Morket Prices** 

GNP 1

			Annyai	Growth Rat	e Since
	Latest Quarter	Percent Change from Previous Quarter	1977:	† Year Earlier	Previous Quarter
United States	78 II	1.8	3.2	4.0	7.4
Japan	78 I	2.4	5.5	5.7	10.0
West Germany	<b>7</b> 8 I	0.1	2.4	1.1	0.4
France	78 1	1.8	4.1	1.4	7.4
United Kingdom	77 IV	-0.5	<b>م.</b> 1	-1.1	- 1.9
Italy	78 I	2.0	1.9	-6.2	8.2
Canada	70 1	0.7	47	2.0	27

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Seasonally adjusted.

# **Constant Prices**

			Annual Growth Rate Sir					
	Latest Month	Percent Change from Previous Month	1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months			
United States	May 78	-0.9	3.1	1.9	5.5			
Japan	Apr 78	4.0	9.9	4.3	24.8			
West Germany	May 78	-0.8	2.3	0	-5.3			
France	Jan 78	9.9	0	1.0	10.5			
United Kingdom	Jul 78	1.7	1.4	5.4	9.0			
Italy	Mar 78	3.6	3.2	5.5	21.1			
Canada	Jun 78	1.4	4.1	4.5	2.2			

<sup>1</sup> Seasonally adjuste

Average

# FIXED INVESTMENT '

Nonresidential; constant prices

			Average				
			Annual	Growth Rat	s Since		
	Latest Quarter	Percent Change from Previous Quarter	1973	1 Year Earlier	Previous Quarter		
United States	78 II	3.6	3.0	7.4	15.1		
Japan	78 I	0.9	1.1	-0.4	3.6		
West Germany	78 I	-0.5	0.7	1,6	- 2.1		
France	77 IV	0.8	4.0	4.7	3.3		
United Kingdom	78 I	1.3	1.6	9.7	5.2		
Italy	78 I	2.3	1.1	- 19.6	9.4		
Canada	78 1	- 3.7	4.8	-12.7	<b>- 14.1</b>		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Seasonally adjusted.

## WAGES IN MANUFACTURING 1

			Annual	Growth Ra	ta Since				
Percent Change									
	Latest Period	from Previous Period	1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Eorlier <sup>2</sup>				
United States	Jun 78	0.5	7.6	7.6	7.2				
Japan	Apr 78	0.3	16.1	8.2	10.3				
West Germany	78 I	0.9	8.9	4.3	3.9				
France	77 IV	3.1	14.1	12.0	12.9				
United Kingdom	May 78	0.5	16.4	20.6	54.9				
Italy	May 78	3.5	20.4	15.5	13.6				
Canada	May 78	0.9	10.9	7.1	6.2				

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Hourly earnings (seasonally adjusted) for the United States, Japon, and Canada; hourly wage rates for others. West German and French data refer to the beginning of the quarter.
<sup>2</sup> Average for latest 3 months compared with that for previous 3 months.

# MONEY MARKET RATES

		Aug 23     7.85     5.89     7.19     7.88       Aug 25     4.50     5.75     4.12     4.62       Aug 23     3.61     4.06     3.62     3.76       Aug 25     7.00     8.25     7.88     7.25				
	Representative rates	Lates	t Dale			
United States	Commercial paper	Aug 23	7.85	5.89	7.19	7.88
Japan	Call money	Aug 25	4.50	5.75	4.12	4.62
West Germany	Interbank loans (3 months)	Aug 23	3.61	4.06	3.62	3.76
France	Call money	Aug 25	7.00	8.25	7.88	7.25
United Kingdom	Sterling in erbank loans 3 months)	Aug 23	9.36	6.60	9.14	10.40
Canada	Finance paper	Aug 23	8.90	7,47	8.13	8.27
Eurodollars	Three-mon <sup>*</sup> ti deposits	Aug 23	8.66	6.36	8.02	8.50

Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months.

# EXPORT PRICES PRIVATE PRICES PRIVATE P US \$

#### Average Annual Growth Rate Since Percent Change from Previous Eorlier Month Month 1970 Earlier 8.3 United States May 78 0.4 9.4 5.0 Jul 78 1.2 11.7 27.0 39.1 Japan 11.5 12.9 -4.0West Germany Jun 78 1.7 Apr 78 12.1 17.9 36.2 3.4 France 23.8 3.7 11.8 20.4 United Kingdam Jul 78 6.0 10.9 9.6 6.7 Apr 78 Italy 3.8 8.4 0.3 Canada May 78 1.8

National Currency

					Average				
			Annual	Growth Ro	te Since				
		Percent Change							
	Latest	from Previous		1 Year	3 Months				
	Month	Month	1970	Earlier	Earlier				
United States	May 78	0.4	9.4	5.0	8.3				
Japan	Jul 7B	-5.8	3.8	-4.3	- 8.8				
West Germany	Jun 78	0.7	3.9	-0.1	4.9				
France	Apr 78	0.9	9.4	8.9	21.0				
United Kingdam	Jul 78	0.5	15.1	9.4	11.3				
Italy	Apr 78	-0.6	15.4	5.7	- 1.6				
Canada	May 78	-0.2	9.3	7.0	- 6.0				

#### **IMPORT PRICES**

National Currency

			Annual	Growth Rat	te Since
	Latest Month	Percent Change from Previous Month	1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Eorlier
United States	May 78	-0.3	12.8	5.4	6.8
Japan	Jul 78	-6.6	5.8	-20.9	-22.7
West Germany	Jun 78	- 1.6	3.0	-5.9	- 12.5
France	Apr 78	-2.2	9.3	0.2	1.6
United Kingdam	Jul 78	0.1	17.4	1.8	8.2
Italy	Apr 78	-0.7	18.9	4.7	- 8.3
Canada	Apr 78	0	8.5	11.1	- 5.3

Average

## OFFICIAL RESERVES

				Billion US	5
	Lates	t Month		-	-
			-	1 Year	3 Months
	End of	Billion US \$	Jun 1970	Earlier	Earlier
United States	Jun 78	18.9	14.5	19.2	19.2
Japan	Jul 78	29.3	4.1	17.6	<b>2</b> 7.5
West Germany	Jun 78	40.7	8.8	34.3	42.2
France	Apr 78	10.6	4.4	10.0	0.1
United Kingdam	May 78	17.3	2.8	10.0	21.4
Italy	Jun 78	13.2	4.7	9.7	10.6
Canada	Jul 78	4.6	9.1	5.0	4.6

## CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE'

			Comulative (Million US \$)				
	Latest Period	Million US \$	1978	1977	Change		
United States <sup>2</sup>	78 I	-6,954	-6,954	-4,158	- 2,796		
Japan	Jul 78	2,050	10,879	4,630	6,249		
West Germany	Jul 78	- 1,700	2,015	1,406	609		
France	78 I	0	0	-2	2		
United Kingdam	78 I	-803	803	- 896	94		
Italy	77 III	2,390	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.		
Canada	78 I	-1,273	- 1,273	<b>- 1,484</b>	212		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Converted to US dollars at the current market rates of exchange.

# BASIC BALANCE 1

Current Account and Long-Term Capital Transactions Cumulative (Million US \$)

	Latest Period	Million US \$	1978	1977	Change	
United States	1	Na lan	ger publi	shed <sup>2</sup>		
Japan	Jul 78	650	6,231	3,513	2,718	
West Germany	Jun 78	265	2,801	- 1,165	3,966	
France	78 I	-1	<b>— 1</b>	-2	1	
United Kingdam	78 I	- 326	-326	543	- 869	
Italy	77 III	2,520	N.A.	N.A.	Ñ.A.	
Canada	78 I	- 668	-668	- 584	84	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Converted to US dollers at the current market rates of exchange

# **EXCHANGE RATES**

Spot Rate			Percent Ch	range from	
As af 18 Aug 78	US \$ Per Unit	19 Mar 73	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier	11 Aug 78
Japan (yen)	0.0054	41.34	43.14	21.72	0.47
West Germany	0.5038	42.27	17.30	6.82	-0.91
(Deutsche mark)					
France (franc)	0.2318	5.18	13.87	8.07	-0.34
United Kingdam (pound sterling)	1.9850	- 19.34	14.22	9.55	1.07
Italy (lira)	0.0012	-31.92	6.45	5.06	0.42
Canada (dollar)	0.8783	- 11.97	- 5.44	- 1.92	-0.22

# TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE RATES '

As of 18 Aug 78

-		Percer	t Change from	n
	1 <b>9</b> Mar 73	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier	11 Aug 78
United States	-4.49	- 10.10	-6.11	-0.13
Japan	44.81	38.30	19.27	0.38
West Germany	30.28	3.95	-0.14	-1.24
France	-7.76	- 0.09	1.16	-0.35
United Kingdam	- 27.92	2.75	2.88	0.34
Italy	- 42.58	- 6.52	-1.61	0.58
Canada	- 13.58	- 9.17	<b>-4.18</b>	-0.34
West Germany France United Kingdam	30.28 -7.76 -27.92 -42.58	3.95 - 0.09 2.75 - 6.52	-0.14 1.16 2.88 -1.61	-1.3 -0.3 0.3

<sup>1</sup> Weighting is based on each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized countries to Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA#RDP60T00762A00000000000000406 the major currencies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Seasonally adjusted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> As recommended by the Advisory Committee on the Presentation of Bakanca of Payments Statistics, the Department of Commerce no longer publishes a basic balance.

Developed Countries: Direction of Trade 1

Billion US \$

	Exports to (f.o.b.)								
_				()					
	World	Big Seven	Other OECD	OPEC	Com- munist	Other			
UNITED STATES									
1975	107.65	46.94	16.25	10. <i>77</i>	3.37	29.83			
1976	115.01	51. <b>3</b> 0	17.68	12.57	3.64	29.4			
1977	120,17	53.92	18.53	14.02	2.72	30.9			
1978									
1st Qtr	30.94	13.65	4.60	3.76	1.00	7.9			
Apr	12.06	5.40	1.68	1.38	0.42	3.1			
JAPAN	12.00	5							
1975	55.73	16.56	6.07	8.42	5.16	15.8			
1976	67.32	22.61	8.59	9.27	4,93	17.8			
1977	81.11	28.02	9.73	12.03	5.32	26.0			
1978	<b>U</b> 1.11	10.01	7.70	12.00	0.02				
1st Qtr	22.11	7.83	2.39	3.35	1.32	7,2			
Apr	7.89	2.80	0.80	1.19	0.57	2.5			
WEST GERMANY	7.07	2.00	0.00	,	0.07	2.0			
1975	91.70	28.33	36,44	6.78	8.81	11.0			
1976			41.86	8.25	8.72	11.0			
	103.63	33.44 39.01	48.00	10.78	8.59	12.9			
1977 1978	119.28	39.01	48.00	10.78	0.39	12.9			
1st Qtr	32.45	11.17	13.05	2.76	1,97	3.5			
FRANCE									
1975	52.87	20.00	15.50	4.90	3.13	8.6			
1976	57.05	22.49	16.15	5.08	3.23	8.7			
ł977	65.00	25.90	18.19	5.97	3.00	11.9			
1978									
1st Qtr	18.49	7.66	5.07	1.57	0.66	3.5			
Apr	6.74	2.82	1.90	0.56	0.28	1.1			
UNITED KINGDOM									
1975	44.03	12,55	16.59	4.55	1.56	8.6			
1976	46.12	14.03	17.53	5.13	1.39	7.9			
1977	57.44	16.99	22.56	6,78	1,63	9.4			
1978									
1st Qtr	16.86	5.09	6.27	2.03	0.55	2.9			
Apr	5.75	1.73	2.19	0.74	0.18	0.9			
ITALY									
1975	34.82	15.61	7.86	3.72	2.46	4.6			
1976	36.96	17.41	8.69	4.23	2.18	3.9			
1977	45.04	20.92	10.20	5.85	2.45	5.6			
1978				• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •					
: 1st Qtr	10.80	5.25	2.37	1.37	0.48	1.3			
CANADA	10.00	0.20	,						
1975	33.84	26.30	1.73	0.71	1.20	2.0			
1976	40.18	32.01	2.03	0.81	1.25	2.0			
1977	42.98	34.77	2.03	0.94	1.25	4.0			
	42.70	34.77	2.13	Ų.7 <b>4</b>	1.00	4.0			
1978	10.75	0 70	A = =	0.00	0.33	0.0			
1st Qtr	10.75	8.78	0.55	0.23	0.22	0.9			
Apr	4.20	3.44	0.16	0.08	0.07	0.4			

<sup>\*</sup>Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade.


Developed Countries: Direction of Trade <sup>1</sup>


Billion US \$

_	Imports from (c.i.f.)							
	World	Sig Seven	Other OECD	OPEC	Com- munist	Other		
UNITED STATES			-					
1975	103.42	49.81	8.83	18.70	0.98	25.0		
1976	129.57	60.39	9.75	27.17	1.16	31.09		
1977	156.70	70.48	11.08	35.45	1.22	38.47		
1978								
1st Qtr	43.14	20.39	3.51	8.15	0.47	10.6		
Apr	15.42	7.54	1.27	2.73	0.18	3.7		
JAPAN								
1975	<b>57.8</b> 5	16.93	6.08	19.40	3.36	12.0		
1976	64.89	1 <i>7</i> .58	7.78	21.88	2.91	14.73		
1977	71.33	18.87	7.93	24.33	3.41	16.79		
1978								
1st Qtr	18.32	5.04	2.06	6.46	0.87	3.89		
Apr	6.28	1.64	0.74	2.01	0.36	1.5		
WEST GERMANY								
1975	76.28	27.09	27.78	8.24	4.87	8.2		
1976	89.68	31.28	32.64	9.73	5.93	10.0		
1977	102.63	36.38	37.37	10.12	6.14	12.6		
1978								
1st Qtr	28.24	10.11	10.88	2.32	1.39	3.5		
FRANCE								
1975	53.99	23.04	14.33	9.43	1.94	5.2		
1976	64.38	27.81	16.93	11.36	2.24	6.0		
1977	70.50	30.28	18.24	11.82	2.46	7.7		
1978								
1st Qtr	19.76	8.58	5.40	3.05	0.64	2.0		
Apr	6.79	3.02	1.84	1.00	0.23	0.7		
UNITED KINGDOM								
1975	53.35	18.47	18.52	6.91	1.68	7.6		
1976	55.56	19.66	18.81	7.29	2.08	7.6		
1977	63.29	24.02	21.34	6.31	2.40	9.2		
1978								
1st Qtr	18.87	7.44	6.68	1.80	0.55	2.4		
Apr	5.67	2.27	2.04	0.39	0.16	0.8		
ITALY								
1975	38.36	17.32	6.75	7.85	2.09	4.3		
1976	43.42	19.35	8.04	8.12	2.65	5.2		
1977	47.56	20.80	8.67	9.03	2.80	6.2		
1978								
1st Qtr	11.26	5.03	2.10	2.18	0.51	1.4		
CANADA								
1975	38.59	29.78	1.70	3.43	0.32	2.0		
1976	43.05	33.55	1.82	3.48	0.38	2.5		
1977	44.67	35.67	1.77	3.05	0.33	3.8		
1978								
1st Qtr	10.80	8.60	0.44	0.77	0.08	0.9		
Apr	4.61	3.84	0.18	0.03	0.19	0.3		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade.

# FOREIGN TRADE BILLION US \$, f.o.b., seasonally adjusted





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
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
1,817

Balance

100

# Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000800030004-6 FOREIGN TRADE PRICES IN US \$1





# Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000800030004-6 SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

#### INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1 Annual Growth Rate Since Percent Change from Previous 1 Year 1970 Period Earlier Earlier 2 India Mar 78 1,1 4,9 8.0 17.8 South Korea Jun 78 -- 1.2 22,5 20.1 26.5 Mexico Apr 78 13.1 6.7 14.1 8.6 Nigerla 78 I 6.8 11,0 0.2 29.9 Taiwan Apr 78 15.3 17.4 - 2.0 <sup>1</sup> Seasonally adjusted. \*Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months. **CONSUMER PRICES**

MONEY SUPPLY									
		-	Average Annual Growth Rate Since						
		Percent Change			3111.4				
	Latest	from Previous		1 Year	3 Months				
1	Month	Month	1970	Earlier	Earlier ?				
Brazil	Mar 78	2.7	36.4	43.3	34.7				
India	Feb 78	-0.6	13.7	16.0	20.4				
Iran	Mar 78	9.9	29.3	22.5	51.7				
Sauth Korea	May 78	1.3	31.2	30.7	23.7				
Mexica	May 78	3.9	20.8	33.0	24.9				
Nigerla	Dec 77	-5.2	35.4	38.1	34.0				
Taiwan	Mar 78	5.3	25.2	31.0	24.3				
Thailand	Jan 78	2.7	13.2	13.7	21.5				

Seasonally adjusted.

WHOLESALE PRICES

			Average		
		= 1	Annual Growth Fate Since		
		Percent Change			
	Latest	from Previous		1 Year	
	Month	Month	1970	Earlier	
8razil	Jun 78	4.1	28.3	38.0	
India	Mar 78	0.3	7.5	2.9	
Iran	May 78	-0.4	12.4	12.0	
South Korea	Jul 78	1.4	14.6	14.7	
Mexica	Jun 78	1.4	15.0	17.3	
Nigeria	Dec 77	3.2	16.6	31.0	
Taiwan	Apr 78	1.8	10.1	7.6	
Thailand	Apr 78	1.0	8.6	8.8	

			Average		
		Percent Change	Annual Growth Rate Sin		
	Latest Month	from Previous  Month	1970	1 Year Earlier	
8razil	May 78	3.4	28.4	34.5	
India	May 78	0.6	8.0	2.8	
Iran	May 78	0.4	11.0	10.9	
Sauth Korea	Jul 78	0.4	15.8	11.7	
Mexico	Jun 78	1.3	16.6	16.8	
Taiwan	Mar 78	1.1	8.2	1.2	
Thailand	Jan 78	-0.2	9.5	6.4	


			Ave	rage
			Annual Grow	th Rate Sinc
		Percent Change		
	Latest	from Previous		l Year
	Month	Month	1970	Earlier
Brazil	Feb 78	0.4	14.0	1.5
India	Mar 77	-0.9	9.6	17.9
Iran	Jun 78	0	30.8	0
South Korea	78 · I	0.7	8.7	7.7
Nigeria	May 76	-0.1	27.3	12.3
Talwan	Mar 78	- 0.7	11.2	3.8
Thailand	Dec 76	2.0	13.3	13.1


	Later	st Month	Million US \$			
	End of	Million US \$	Jun 1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier	
8razil	Feb 78	6,733	1,013	5,878	5,994	
India	Apr 78	6,064	1,006	4,134	5,411	
Iran	Jun 78	12,068	208	11,025	12,483	
South Korea	May 78	4,101	602	3,519	4,376	
Mexica	Mar 78	1,766	695	1,422	1,723	
Nigeria	Jun 78	2,387	148	4,663	3,906	
Taiwan	Mar 78	1,433	531	1,349	1,447	
Thailand	Jun 78	2,161	978	2,017	2,161	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months.


			Percent Change from		Cumulative (Million US \$)			
	Lates	t Period	3 Months Earlier <sup>1</sup>	1 Year — Earlier	1978	1977	Change	
Brozil	May 78	Exports	84.8	- 3.7	4,743	4,979	4.7%	
	Moy 78	Imports	26.6	1.4	5,110	4,939	3.5%	
	May 78	8olonce			- 367	40	- 407	
Indio	Feb 78	Exports	4.0	12.3	912	917	-0.4%	
	Feb 78	Imports	- 39.6	- 0.2	845	916	-7.7%	
	Feb 78	8olonce			67	1	66	
lron	Apr 78	Exparts	- 34.0	- 8.2	7,615	8,012	- 4.9%	
	Mar 78	Imparts	105.8	14.2	3,694	3,235	14.2%	
	Mar 78	Bolonce			1,991	2,795	804	
South Kareo	May 78	Exparts	14.2	29.3	4,651	3,630	28.1%	
	May 78	Imports	64.3	25.1	4,994	3,905	27.9%	
	May 78	8olonce		1	- 343	- 275	- 68	
Mexico	May 78	Exports	-2.2	6.5	2,037	1,773	14.9%	
	Moy 78	Imparts	11.6	25.7	2,340	1,868	25.3%	
	Moy 78	8alonce			- 304	<b>- 95</b>	209	
Nigerio	Apr 78	Exports	-55.4	- 29.9	1,143	1,597	- 28.4%	
	Aug 77	Imports	56.1	80.1	2,535	1,640	54.6%	
	Aug 77	8olance			716	979	- 263	
Toiwon	Apr 78	Exports	- 27.6	32.3	3,365	2,543	32.3%	
	Apr 78	Imports	- 14.5	20.4	2,869	2,338	22.7%	
	Арг 78	Bolonce			496	205	291	
Thailand	Apr 78	Exparts	27.0	3.2	1,277	1,221	4.6%	
	Apr 78	Imports	6.5	14.3	1,449	1,251	15.8%	
	Арг 78	8olonce			- 172	-30	- 141	

# Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000800030004-6 AGRICULTURAL PRICES MONTHLY AVERAGE CASH PRICE






# INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS PRICES MONTHLY AVERAGE CASH PRICE



## **SELECTED MATERIALS**

			CURRENT	FEB 78	AUG 77	AUG 76
·	Malantin Rose Assess			50.00	53.00	47.00
ALUMINUM	Major US Producer	ć per pound	55.00	53.00	53.00	47.09
US STEEL	Composite	\$ per long ton	419.31	387.54	357.08	327.00
IRON ORE	Non-Bessemer Old Range	\$ per long ton	21.43	21.43	21.43	20.05
CHROME ORE	Russian, Metallurgical Grade	\$ per metric ton	NA	NA	150.00	150.00
CHROME ORE	S. Africa, Chemical Grade	\$ per long ton	56.00	58.00	58.50	42.00
FERROCHROME	US Producer, 66-70 Percent	ć per pound	42.00	41.00	42.39	44.56
NICKEL	Composite US Producer	\$ per pound	2.07	2.06	2.41	2.20
MANGANESE ORE	48 Percent Mn	\$ per long ton	67.20	72.24	72.00	72.00
TUNGSTEN ORE	Contained Metal	\$ per metric ton	17,528.00	19,048.00	21,111.00	5,325.00
MERCURY	New York	\$ per 76 pound flask	183.00	162.32	116.30	110.00
SILVER	LME Cash	é per troy ounce	560.70	498.44	447.09	425.81
GOLD	London Afternoon Fixing Price	\$ per troy ounce	212.64	178.18	144.95	109.65





1970=100

300



1-15 AUG | 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

<sup>1</sup>Approximates world market price frequently used by major world producers and traders, although only small quantities of these metals are actually traded on the LME.

 $^2\mbox{Producers'}$  price, covers most primary metals sold in the U.S.

<sup>3</sup>As of 1 Dec 75. US tin price quoted is "Tin NY 1b composite."

<sup>4</sup>Quoted on New York market.

<sup>5</sup>S-type styrene, US export price.

6 This index is compiled by using the average of 13 types of lumber whose prices are regarded as believthers of US lumber construction costs.

7Composite price for Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh.

NOTE: The industrial materials index is compiled by the <u>Economist</u> for 19 raw materials which enter International trade. Commodities are weighted by 3-year moving averages of imports into industrialized countries.

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